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It has long been argued that attitudes prepare the body to act. While early evidence suggested that evaluations (positive or
negative) are rigidly linked to specific motor behaviors (approach or avoidant), recent behavioral evidence suggests that this
linkage is context dependent. Here, we report that the neural circuitry mediating the relationship between evaluations and motor
responses promotes flexibility in our embodiment of attitudes. In a behavioral study, stimulus–response relationships between
evaluations and actions were rapidly conditioned. In a neuroimaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging) study, repetition
suppression demonstrated that these relationships are formed in neural systems traditionally implicated in arbitrary sensori-
motor mappings (i.e. the dorsal premotor cortex and posterior superior parietal lobule). These data provide the first neurophysio-
logical evidence for attitude embodiment and demonstrate that relationships between evaluation and action are inherently
malleable.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers have long argued that attitudes prepare our
bodies to act (Darwin, 1872; James, 1890; Cacioppo et al.,
1993; Chen and Bargh, 1999). Direct relationships between
positive or negative evaluations and motor behavior, the
reasoning goes, allow us to respond quickly and without
conscious deliberation to the desirable and undesirable fea-
tures of the environment. Traditionally, research on this
form of attitude embodiment has demonstrated apparently
rigid associations between evaluations and specific motor
behaviors (Solarz, 1960; Chen and Bargh, 1999). Recent find-
ings, however, draw this rigidity into question with evidence
that the associations are context dependent (Markman and
Brendl, 2005; Lavender and Hommel, 2007; Bamford and
Ward, 2008; Eder and Rothermund, 2008). These findings
raise fundamental questions regarding the phenomenon.
How are general evaluations (positive vs negative) linked
with specific motor behaviors? Do these relationships
adapt over time and across situations? If so, what neural
mechanism can account for this plasticity? In a pair of stu-
dies, we used behavioral and neuroimaging techniques to
demonstrate that evaluation triggers action through condi-
tioned stimulus–response relationships equivalent to arbi-
trary sensorimotor mappings. In doing so, we provide the
first neurophysiological evidence for attitude embodiment
and illustrate its inherent malleability.
In the classic demonstration that evaluations facilitate
motor behavior, participants are instructed to either pull
or push a lever while looking at negatively or positively
valenced targets (Solarz, 1960; Chen and Bargh, 1999).
Typically, participants pull the lever more quickly when
the target is positive and push the lever more quickly
when the target is negative, regardless of whether or not
the task has evaluative goals (Chen and Bargh, 1999). Early
accounts of this phenomenon attributed these embodied
patterns to conditioned associations between specific
muscle activations and specific evaluations (Cacioppo
et al., 1993). The theory proposed that a lifetime of pulling
desirable objects toward ourselves links positive evaluation
with arm flexion and a lifetime of pushing undesirable ob-
jects away from us links negative evaluation with arm exten-
sion. Specific motor behaviors, then, become an integral part
of the cognitive representation of attitudes (Niedenthal et al.,
2005).
A more flexible account of embodied social cognition pro-
poses that motor facilitation varies in different situations.
Indeed, such flexibility ensures behavioral adaptiveness to a
continuously changing environment. Along these lines, sev-
eral recent studies suggest that positively valenced stimuli
facilitate actions that lead to approach while negatively
valenced stimuli facilitate actions that lead to avoidance, re-
gardless of the specific motor behavior employed (Wentura
et al., 2000; Markman and Brendl, 2005; van Dantziget al.,
2008). Other data suggest that, more generally, actions with
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rewarding vs punishing outcomes (regardless of target va-
lence) are facilitated (Bamford and Ward, 2008). Still more
findings suggest that a specific motor behavior can be as-
signed a positive or negative semantic label (i.e. through
instruction sets or aversive conditioning) and that subse-
quent use of that motor behavior is facilitated by exposure
to stimuli of matching valence (Beckers et al., 2002; Eder and
Rothermund, 2008). These studies provide mounting evi-
dence that the influence of evaluation on action is driven
by malleable processes that can adapt to experience and situ-
ational constraints.
One obvious way in which motor behavior, more gener-
ally, shows malleability is in the degree to which arbitrary
linkages form between sensory cues and actions. This con-
ditional motor learning allows for action to be triggered
without any reference to spatial relationships. A colored
plaque (e.g. Halsband and Freund, 1990) or a blinking
LED (e.g. Grafton et al., 1998) can act as a cue, despite the
fact that its appearance and its mapping to the behavior are
arbitrarily assigned. This capability affords a broad action
repertoire driven by signaling and symbolically guided
action (e.g. Wise and Murray, 2000). We hypothesized that
evaluation can cue action in a similar fashion such that
stimulus–response relationships between a specific evalu-
ation (positive vs negative) and a specific motor behavior
can be conditioned quickly and arbitrarily (and with no ne-
cessary relationship to physical approach and avoidance).
We further hypothesized that neural representations of
these relationships between implicit evaluation and action
operate much the same as arbitrary sensorimotor mappings
between explicit stimuli and motor responses.
Existing research suggests that the dorsal premotor cortex
(PMd) and superior parietal cortex are directly involved in
conditioned motor responses (Wise et al., 1996; Grol et al.,
2006) and are partly responsible for the flexible nature of
action repertoires (Wise and Murray, 2000). Non-human
primate data from lesion studies (Halsband and
Passingham, 1982), single cell recordings (Mitz et al., 1991;
Hoshi and Tanji, 2006) and muscimol injections (Kurata
and Hoffman, 1994), as well as human lesion (Halsband
and Freund, 1990) data suggest that the PMd is necessary
for the execution of behaviors cued by non-spatial stimuli.
Human functional imaging studies have further shown this
region to be active in motor planning cued by arbitrarily
associated visual (Grafton et al., 1998; Toni et al., 2001),
audio, and sensorimotor stimuli (Weeks et al., 2001).
Recent work using repetition suppression paradigms has
also implicated this region in stimulus–response mappings
that are independent of spatial or sensory properties of a
given target (Majdandzic et al., 2009).
Imaging work (Grafton et al., 1998) also suggests that the
superior parietal lobe is specifically involved in the condi-
tional selection of grasp (as compared to non-conditional
motor tasks). Furthermore, blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) activity in the posterior parietal cortex has been
shown to increase with overlearning of arbitrary sensori-
motor relationships (Grol et al., 2006). Although we did
not limit our analyses to specific areas of the brain, given
our hypothesis that evaluations are comparable to
non-spatial cues for action, we were particularly interested
in whether or not the influence of evaluation on action
would modulate recruitment of the PMd and posterior su-
perior parietal areas during response selection.
To test these hypotheses, we first had participants
complete a task in which they moved a joystick to rate the
positivity or negativity of a series of images. We then
tested reaction times and neural responses when those
same movements were used in non-evaluative tasks invol-
ving valenced words. We predicted that implicit relation-
ships between evaluation and action formed during the
rating task would lead to a valence-specific facilitation of




Sixty-seven undergraduate students (47 women) participated
in Experiment 1 (a behavioral experiment) for course credit.
Twenty-five participants (10 women) participated in
Experiment 2 [an functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) experiment] for pay.
Materials
Both experiments included training and testing phases. The
images used in the training phase were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al.,
1990). The words used in the testing phase were taken
from the set used in Chen and Bargh (1999) and from the
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley and
Lang, 1999). All experimental tasks were created with
Python 2.4. In Experiment 2, both tasks were completed in
a Siemens Magnetrom Trio 3T MR scanner.
Training task
The training task was the same for both experiments.
Participants spent 10 min rating a series of images on a
visually vertical scale from ‘extremely positive’ to ‘extremely
negative’ (Figure 1). To record their ratings, participants
moved an indicator (i.e. a ‘tic’) up and down the scale
using a joystick. The mapping of joystick movement to va-
lence was counterbalanced between participants such that for
half of the participants, movement of the joystick in one
direction moved the tic toward the positive end of the
scale and movement of the joystick in the other direction
moved the tic toward the negative end of the scale. For the
other half of the participants this valence-direction mapping
was reversed. For Experiment 1, the two movements used
were clockwise and counterclockwise movement of the joy-
stick. For Experiment 2, leftward and rightward movements
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were used1. The training task took participants 10 min to
complete.
The instructions for the training task did not explicitly
link the direction of movement with valence. Instead, par-
ticipants were simply told to ‘use the scale on the right to
rate the image from extremely positive (þ5) to extremely
negative (-5). Move the scale by twisting [or moving] the
joystick’. The scale itself was arranged vertically on the
screen. As a result, there was also no visual feedback linking
clockwise/counterclockwise or rightward/leftward with
valence.
Testing task: Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, the training task was followed by an osten-
sibly unrelated testing procedure modeled on one used in the
past to investigate the influence of evaluation on motor be-
havior (Chen and Bargh, 1999). In this task, words appeared
at random time intervals on a computer screen. Participants
were instructed to move a joystick as soon as they saw a
word appear. The words on these trials were either positively
or negatively valenced (e.g. ‘cake’, ‘cancer’). There were two
blocks of trials in this task and within each block participants
moved the joystick in the same direction for every trial. The
joystick movements used for these two blocks of trials were
the two movements used in the training task. As such, the
word on a given trial could either be affectively congruent or
incongruent with the hypothetically trained valence of the
joystick movement for that block of trials. Importantly, va-
lence and movement were completely crossed to produce
congruent and incongruent trials such that each trial type
included both valences and movement types.
Testing task: Experiment 2
The testing phase of Experiment 2 was designed to tease
apart the presentation of the valenced stimuli from their
corresponding actions such that they occurred at two separ-
ate events. Participants completed two runs of 80 coupled
trials. For each trial, a word appeared for 2 s, disappeared,
and then an arrow appeared for an additional 2 s.
Participants were given two separate goals and these instruc-
tions were repeated at the beginning of each run of trials. For
the word portion of a trial, they were instructed to press a
button on top of the joystick if they saw a nonsense word
(e.g. ‘vaseball’). The nonsense word detection was included
to ensure that participants would attend to the words. Two
nonsense words appeared per run such that participants saw
78 words per run and 2 non-words. Because they do not
pertain to the hypotheses tested here, the nonsense word
trials were excluded from all analyses. For the arrow portion
of a trial, participants were instructed to move the joystick in
the direction cued by the arrow. The direction of the arrow
varied randomly from trial to trial and the order of each
participant’s trials was unique.
The words presented on these trials were either positively
or negatively valenced. Because the required movement on a
given trial had been paired with a valence during in the
training task, joystick movements could either be congruent
or incongruent with the preceding word’s valence (Figure 2).
As in the Testing Task for Experiment 1, both incongruent
and congruent trials included both valences and movement
types.
Fig. 1 Screenshot of the training task. Participants rated a series of images using the scale on the right side of the screen. Participants moved the indicator up and down the
scale using a joystick. Movement of the joystick in one direction moved the tic up while movement of the joystick in the other direction moved the tic down. The specific
valence-direction pairing was counterbalanced between participants.
1The specific motor movements used in the two studies differed for practical reasons, but with theoretically
justification. The joystick used in Experiment 2 did not have the twist feature of the joystick used outside of
the scanner. However, varying the movement between experiments emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the
assignment of a given movement to a valence.
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fMRI data acquisition and analysis
Functional images were acquired during Experiment 2 s runs
using an EPI pulse sequence (37 slices, TR¼ 2). All analysis
procedures were carried out using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion
.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Slice timing correction was applied to cor-
rect for the temporal discrepancy between the acquisitions of
multiple two dimensional slices comprising each three di-
mensional brain volume. Functional images were aligned
with the first image from each scanning run to correct for
head movement. The images from each run were then cor-
egistered to the given participant’s high resolution anatom-
ical T1 image and normalized to the standardized Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) stereotaxic template and
resliced at a 2 2 2 voxel resolution. Images were then
spatially smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel
(8 mm full width half maximum). One participant was
excluded from analyses because of a structural abnormality
revealed in the anatomic scan. One other participant was
excluded from analyses because he rotated the joystick
908 between the training and testing phases (thereby
undermining the effects of the training phase on the testing
phase). One run from one other participant was excluded
because he fell asleep during the run.
A fixed-effects analysis was conducted for each partici-
pant, using a general linear model to assess the BOLD re-
sponse at each voxel for each moment of interest: congruent
movements and incongruent movements. The word presen-
tation events were not modeled. The nonsense word trials
were excluded from analysis. The model contained one
regressor for each condition, plus its temporal and disper-
sion derivatives, as well as a constant for each scanning run.
Linear contrasts were constructed to estimate both BOLD
activity uniquely associated with the condition and the dif-
ference in BOLD activity between congruent and incongru-
ent conditions. The images of the incongruent vs congruent
contrast (one for each condition, for each subject) were sub-
mitted to a random-effects (second-level) analysis in order
to identify significant group effects.
The trials were designed to reveal patterns of repetition
suppression (RS) created by the congruency between the
Fig. 2 Four example trials from the testing portion of the imaging experiment. Row A depicts predictions for a participant trained to associate the rightward movement with
negative valence and the leftward movement with positive valence during the image rating task. Row B depicts the converse. By crossing word valence (negative vs positive) and
movement direction (leftward vs rightward) we defined two congruency conditions. On a given trial, a movement was considered congruent if its trained valence matched the
valence of the preceding word. As such, congruent and incongruent trials included both valences and both movements. Based on the logic of repetition suppression, we expected
reduced BOLD responses in areas representing the triggered movement during the movement portion of congruent trials (shaded in green) but not incongruent trials (shaded in
pink).
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response triggered by a valenced word and an action
(Figure 2). RS paradigms (e.g. Kourtzi and Kanwisher,
2000; Grill-Spector and Malach, 2001; Grafton and
Hamilton, 2007) are based on the observed tendency for a
stimulus to produce reduced neural responses when pre-
sented repeatedly. It follows from this observation that if
the processing of two related stimuli relies on the same
neural mechanisms, neural populations associated with
those mechanisms should show suppression of the BOLD
signal when the two stimuli are presented in succession. As
such, RS can be used to reveal the overlap in functional
neuroanatomy for two cognitive processes based on their
similarity. Along these lines, RS has been used to study the
neural representations of motor responses. For example,
Dinstein et al. (2007, 2008) showed RS for repetitions of
observed and executed actions (as well as for cross-modal
repetitions). Hamilton and Grafton (2009), furthermore,
showed RS in motor-relevant areas for repetitions of
text-instructed actions. Following this logic, we predicted
RS for actions when they were preceded by the presentation
of an evaluatively congruent word. In other words, when
participants read a negative or positive word and then exe-
cuted a motor behavior that had been conditioned to be
associated with that valence, then the areas involved in rep-
resenting that action should show a weaker BOLD signal
than they would during movements preceded by a word
with an incongruent valence. As such, the critical contrast
in this experiment was between trials in which the given
movement was preceded by an incongruently vs a congru-
ently valenced word (the conceptual equivalent of the novel
vs repeat contrast in a traditional RS paradigm).
Importantly, congruent and incongruent trials included
both valences and movements (Figure 2). Because of this
fact, congruency was not determined on a given trial until
the movement cue was revealed. Differences between con-
gruency conditions, then, must necessarily emerge during
the movement portion of the trials and as a conse-
quence of the relationship between word valence and the
movement.
To hone in on areas that were involved in both trial types
and to look at relative differences in activity during the
movement portion of trials, we used a mask based on all
the areas activated during the movement portion of all of
the trials (at a threshold of P< 0.05).
RESULTS
Experiment 1
If a given valence facilitates a specific motor behavior, then
participants should be faster at executing that behavior
when a word of that valence is used as a cue for action
(i.e. when the word and the action are evaluatively congru-
ent). As such, the critical-dependent variable in Experiment
1 was reaction time (RT). RTs were log-transformed and
aggregated by word valence and the evaluative congruency
of the movement. RTs two standard deviations above or
below the mean were omitted from analyses (Ratcliff,
1993). An ANOVA with one between-subjects variable
(training group) and two within-subjects variables (congru-
ency and word valence) was performed. This ANOVA
revealed the predicted influence of congruency whereby
participants were faster on congruent vs incongruent
tri [F(1,65)¼ 8.82, P¼ 0.004, log transformed RT means
and SEs: Mcongruent¼0.865þ0.016, Mincongruent¼
0.852þ0.017, RT means and SEs: Mcongruent¼
0.430þ0.00, Mincongruent¼ 0.437þ0.008]. No other fac-
tors or interactions were significant in this analysis, all
F’s < 3.05, P’s> 0.09. More importantly, the interaction be-
tween congruency and training group was far from signifi-
cant, F(1,65)¼ 0.04, suggesting that the congruency pattern
held for both training groups (i.e. both clockwise and
counter-clockwise twisting movements were successfully
associated with either valence).
The initial rating task conditioned associations between
valence and action such that during the testing task valenced
words facilitated their actions. Importantly, this effect
emerged despite the fact that the training phase used
images and the testing phase used words, highlighting the
fact that evaluated valence (and not some other feature of the
stimuli) was the common factor facilitating action.
Experiment 2
The contrast of BOLD activity between the incongruent and
congruent trials was significant (at Puncorrected < 0.001) in
several areas (Figure 3, Table 1). Of particular interest was
greater activity in the PMd (x¼28, y¼ 12, z¼ 40,
tmax¼ 4.54) and the posterior superior parietal lobule
(x¼20, y¼48, z¼ 41, tmax¼ 4.57). Conversely, no
areas emerged with significantly greater activity in the re-
verse contrast (congruent vs incongruent trials). These pat-
terns support our hypothesis that RS occurred in congruent,
but not incongruent trials. Furthermore, the stronger BOLD
response for incongruent trials in these critical areas, irre-
spective of the particular movement paired with a given
evaluation, is consistent with our hypothesis that attitudes
trigger action via conditioned stimulus–response associ-
ations instantiated by neural mechanisms responsible for ar-
bitrary (and inherently flexible) sensorimotor mechanisms.
Although Experiment 2 was not designed to look at reac-
tion time differences, we conducted an ANOVA on these
data with one between-subjects variable (training group)
and two within-subjects variables (congruency and word va-
lence). This analysis revealed no significant effects (all
P’s> 0.40). The fact that there were no significant RT differ-
ences between incongruent and congruent trials was not par-
ticularly surprising given that the experimental task included
two separate events (presentation of the word and then the
movement cue). Moreover, participants were instructed to
move the joystick in the direction of the arrow and were not
told (as in Experiment 1) to move as quickly as possible, a
fact reflected in the relatively slow reaction times
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(M¼ 700 ms). As such, the movements in Experiment 2 were
slower and likely more controlled responses.
DISCUSSION
These data provide the first neural evidence for the direct
influence of attitudes on motor behavior. Moreover, they
demonstrate that general categories of evaluation (positive
vs negative) trigger specific actions through flexible associ-
ations that are comparable to the kinds of mappings
described in the literature on non-spatial motor
conditioning.
In these experiments participants were first unobtrusively
trained to associate positive or negative evaluations with
specific motor behaviors through a task in which they
rated a series of images. These pairings affected reaction
times in a subsequent task in which participants’ only goal
was to respond when a word appeared on the screen.
Participants were faster to respond to words with a specific
movement when the word’s valence matched the condi-
tioned valence of that movement. In the testing phase of
the fMRI experiment, participants repeatedly executed the
same behaviors that had been used in the rating task.
When behaviors were preceded by words of a congruent
valence, motor-relevant areas of the brain showed relatively
suppressed activity, notably in the PMd and posterior
superior parietal areas. Evaluations of the words apparently
activated associated motor representations, facilitating
action and resulting in repetition suppression in those
areas. The fact that participants were trained on images
and tested on words underscores our claim that the valence
of the stimuli drove these effects.
Together these data provide one neurophysiological
mechanism by which attitudes become embodied. This
mechanism is inherently plastic: automatized relationships
between attitudes and motor behaviors emerge as a conse-
quence of conditioning such that experience helps determine
how attitudes are embodied by the individual in the
moment. The functional benefits of this flexibility are
clear. We adapt to respond appropriately to the positive or
negative features of our environment.
In addition to providing one explanation for the contra-
dictory evaluation-to-behavior patterns demonstrated in the
behavioral literature, these findings argue strongly for a con-
ceptualization of this form of embodied social cognition not
as rigid sets of mappings, but as flexible relationships that
adapt and change with experience. Of course common pat-
terns in attitude embodiment occur across individuals.
Prime examples are the classic negative valence/arm exten-
sion and positive valence/arm flexion patterns described re-
peatedly in the literature (Solarz, 1960; Chen and Bargh,
1999). But while these and other findings tie the influence
Fig. 3 Areas showing repetition suppression for attitude-primed action. The contrast shown here is between trials that were preceded by an evaluatively incongruent vs
congruent word. These analyses used a mask based on areas active during the movement portion of all trials.
Table 1. Significant voxels (Puncorrected < 0.001) emerging from the incongruent vs congruent movement contrast from Experiment 2
Region Voxels Peak voxel Talaraich coord
t x y z
Left middle frontal gyrus and superior frontal sulcus, BA 6,8 56 4.54 28 12 40
Left parietal cortex, superior parietal lobule, BA 7 52 4 20 48 41
Right parietal cortex, post-central gyrus, BA 2 41 5.07 57 22 36
Right inferior parietal lobule, BA 40 19 4.22 50 35 42
Right middle frontal gyrus and superior frontal sulcus, BA 6,8 29 3.97 30 5 61
24 4.21 24 2 42
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of evaluation on motor behavior to approach and avoidance,
the current findings demonstrate that the link between an
evaluation and an action can be totally arbitrary, with no
reference to physical or symbolic approach or avoidance.
Clearly, avoiding negative targets and approaching positive
targets are beneficial patterns to learn, but they are not the
limit of evaluation’s influence on action.
While the current data focus on the effects of evaluation
on specific motor behaviors, recent studies have demon-
strated that evaluation facilitates approach/avoidance
action outcomes regardless of the motor behaviors used to
facilitate those outcomes (Markman and Brendl, 2005;
Bamford and Ward, 2008). We do not consider the findings
reported here to be at odds with those data. Given that
action planning is organized and represented hierarchically,
from low-level kinematics to higher level outcomes (Grafton
and Hamilton, 2007), we suggest that evaluation influences
action at multiple levels of this hierarchy. The current find-
ings illustrate the effects of evaluation on action kinematics,
while the above-referenced findings address evaluation’s in-
fluence on action outcomes. This multi-leveled facilitation of
action by evaluation would support optimal responses across
a broad range of circumstances.
The neuroimaging data presented here implicate the doral
premotor cortex and posterior superior parietal areas in the
influence of evaluation on motor behavior. Because existing
research has also implicated these areas in arbitrary sensori-
motor mapping (Halsband and Passingham, 1982; Halsband
and Freund, 1990; Mitz et al., 1991; Kurata and Hoffman,
1994; Wise, et al., 1996; Grafton et al., 1998; Toni et al., 2001;
Weeks et al., 2001; Grol et al., 2006; Hoshi and Tanji, 2006;
Majdandzic et al., 2009), we interpret these data to support
our claim that attitudes influence action through comparable
stimulus–response relationships. However, because the pre-
sent work focused exclusively on the influence of evaluation
on action, we cannot conclude from these data that the
mechanisms involved are the same. In fact, given the dra-
matically different nature of sensory cues vs valenced evalu-
ations (a subjective, affective, and relatively abstract response
to a target), it would be surprising if their respective influ-
ences on action were not significantly different. Along these
lines, further research will need to identify the shared and
distinct neural mechanisms that underlie attitude embodi-
ment vs more traditional sensorimotor mappings. The
design and interpretation of the neuroimaging experiment
rely upon the logic of repetition suppression. We honed in
on differences in BOLD activity for movements that were
either preceded by a word whose valence was congruent or
incongruent with the given movement’s hypothetically
trained valence. Based on the logic of RS, decreased activity
in critical regions during the congruent vs incongruent trials
indicates shared activation within subpopulations of neurons
responsible for the movement’s representation (for a discus-
sion of RS interpretations of the BOLD signal during motor
behavior, see Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Hamilton and
Grafton, 2009). Importantly, both trial types included both
types of movement so that the only difference between them
was their congruency, a difference that was only determined
once the movement cue was revealed. As such, although the
word and movement events are relatively close together in
time, we interpret the differences in the BOLD signal as
driven by the congruency of the motor behavior. Although
we cannot test for RS directly, we believe that it provides a
parsimonious account of this congruency effect. However,
we do not necessarily assume that RS, per se, is the mechan-
ism by which evaluation facilitates action. Instead, it pro-
vides evidence for a stimulus–response relationship between
the two. (For more general discussions of RS and behavioral
facilitation see Maccotta and Buckner, 2004; Wig et al., 2005;
Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007).
The critical contrast presented in the analyses of the neu-
roimaging data, between evaluatively incongruent and con-
gruent trials, leaves open an alternative interpretation of the
results. It is possible that the demonstrated effects are not
just driven by RS in congruent trials but also by the recruit-
ment of additional neural mechanisms in the incongruent
trials. For example, if attitudes indeed trigger motor behav-
iors then additional mechanisms may be necessary to over-
ride those behaviors when they are inappropriate. In the
context of our experiment, participants may have needed
to recruit areas responsible for handling response conflict
when moving the joystick in the opposite direction of the
direction cued by the previously presented word. To address
this possibility, our analyses honed in exclusively on areas
that showed activity both for incongruent and congruent
trials. This activation-based masked contrast should high-
light the relative differences between areas that were active
during both conditions and not areas that were exclusively
active during the incongruent condition. As such, it seems
less likely (but still possible) that the areas emerging as sig-
nificant are driven entirely by the incongruent condition.
Another alternative explanation for these results is that the
training task’s instructions generalized to the testing phases
of the experiments such that participants responded to the
test stimuli as though they were still rating them with the
joystick. While we cannot rule out this possibility, the testing
tasks were significantly different from the training task in
several ways. Participants in the training task consciously
evaluated images and took their time to express those evalu-
ations. In the testing tasks, however, participants were not
instructed to evaluate anything. Instead, they merely re-
sponded to various stimuli with specific motor behaviors.
In Experiment 1, they used the same movement repeatedly
for each block of words. In Experiment 2, they did not re-
spond to valenced targets at all, but to arrows. Although the
task goals and demands could still have carried over to the
testing portions of the experiments, the fact that the pattern
of neural activity presented here corresponds to patterns
found in the research on sensorimotor mappings argues
more strongly for the interpretation of our data as








ognitive and Brain Science user on 02 O
ctober 2018
illustrating S–R relationships between attitudes and motor
movements.
Nevertheless, these findings parallel research on the cre-
ation of automatic stimulus-response compatibility effects
through instruction sets (De Houwer, 2004; De Houwer
et al., 2005) and on the facilitation of evaluatively congruent
responses through the explicit labeling of actions as positive
or negative (Eder and Rothermund, 2008). On the one hand,
the instructions in the present study never explicitly linked
movement in any given direction with any specific valence.
Participants were simply told to ‘use the scale to rate the
images’ and to ‘move the joystick’ to do so. The links be-
tween movement and valence in our studies, then, were
formed experientially. We would still argue, however, that
although the formation of these associations may have had
different origins from the formation of pairings in the in-
struction set literature, the resulting S–R relationships are
comparable.
We all have different bodies with different capabilities and
a different history of experiences. Moreover, we possess a
tremendous range of possible actions at any given
moment. The neural systems that support motor behavior
accommodate for this range and for the dynamic nature of
the physical world (Wise and Murray, 2000; Grafton and
Hamilton, 2007). Attitude embodiment taps into this flexi-
bility, allowing us to respond quickly and appropriately to a
highly valenced and constantly changing environment.
REFERENCES
Bamford, S., Ward, R. (2008). Predispositions to approach and avoid are
contextually sensitive and goal dependent. Emotion, 8(2), 174–83.
Beckers, T., De Houwer, J., Eelen, P. (2002). Automatic integration of
non-perceptual action effect features: The case of the associative affective
Simon effect. Psychological Research, 66(3), 166–73.
Bradley, M.M., Lang, P.J. (1999). Affective norms for English words
(ANEW): Stimuli, instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical
report C-1, Gainesville, FL. The Center for Research in
Psychophysiology, University of Florida.
Cacioppo, J.T., Priester, J.R., Berntson, G.G. (1993). Rudimentary
determinants of attitudes: II. Arm flexion and extension have differential
effects on attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 5–17.
Chen, M., Bargh, J.A. (1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation:
Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(2), 215–24.
Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of emotions in man and animals.
Appleton: New York.
De Houwer, J. (2004). Spatial Simon effects with nonspatial responses.
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 49–53.
De Houwer, J., Beckers, T., Vandorpe, S., Custers, R. (2005). Further evi-
dence for the role of mode-independent short-term associations in spatial
Simon effects. Percept Psychophys, 67, 659–66.
Dinstein, I., Gardner, J.L., Jazayeri, M., Heeger, D. (2008). Executed and
observed movements have different distributed representations in human
aIPS. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 11231–9.
Dinstein, I., Hasson, H., Rubin, N., Heeger, D.J. (2007). Brain areas selective
for both observed and executed movements. Journal of Neurophysiology,
98, 1415–27.
Eder, A.B., Rothermund, K. (2008). When do motor behaviors (mis)match
affective stimuli? An evaluative coding view of approach and avoidance
reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137(2), 262–81.
Grafton, S.T., Hamilton, A.F. (2007). Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of
action representation in the brain. Human Movement Science, 26(4),
590–616.
Grafton, S.T., Fagg, A.H., Arbib, M.A. (1998). Dorsal premotor cortex and
conditional movement selection: A PET functional mapping study.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 79, 1092–7.
Grill-Spector, K., Malach, R. (2001). fMR-adaptation: a tool for studying the
functional properties of human cortical neurons. Acta Psychologica, 107,
293–321.
Grol, M.J., de Lange, F.P., Verstraten, F.A.J., Passingham, R.E., Toni, I.
(2006). Cerebral changes during performance of overlearned arbitrary
visuomotor associations. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 117–25.
Halsband, U., Freund, H.J. (1990). Premotor cortex and conditional motor
learning in man. The Brain, 113, 207–22.
Halsband, U., Passingham, R. (1982). The role of premotor and parietal
cortex in the direction of action. Brain Research, 240, 368–72.
Hamilton, A.F., Grafton, S.T. (2009). Repetition suppression for per-
formed hand gestures revealed by fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 30,
2898–906.
Hoshi, E., Tanji, J. (2006). Differential involvement of neurons in the dorsal
and venral premotor cortex during processing of visual signals for action
planning. Journal of Neurophysiology, 95, 3596–616.
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, New York: Dover
Publications.
Kourtzi, Z., Kanwisher, N. (2000). Cortical regions involved in perceiving
object shape. Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 3310–18.
Kurata, K., Hoffman, D.S. (1994). Differential effects of muscimol micro-
injection intro dorsal and ventral aspects of the premotor cortex of mon-
keys. Journal of Neurophysiology, 71, 1151–64.
Lang, P.J., Bradley, M.M., Cuthbert, B.N. (1990). Emotion, attention, and
the startle reflex. Psychological Review, 97(3), 377–95.
Lavender, T., Hommel, B. (2007). Affect and action: towards an
event-coding account. Cognition and Emotion, 21(6), 1270–96.
Maccotta, L., Buckner, R.L. (2004). Evidence for neural effects of repetition
that directly correlate with behavioral priming. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 16, 1625–32.
Majdandzic, J., Bekkering, H., van Schie, H.T., Toni, I. (2009).
Movement-specific repetition suppression in ventral and dorsal premotor
cortex during action observation. Cerebral Cortex, 19(11), 2736–2745.
Markman, A.B., Brendl, C.M. (2005). Constraining theories of embodied
cognition. Psychological Science, 16(1), 6–10.
Mitz, A.R., Godschalk, M., Wise, S.P. (1991). Learning-dependent neuronal
activity in the premotor cortex: activity during the acquisition of condi-
tional motor associations. Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 1855–72.
Niedenthal, P.M., Barsalou, L.W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S.,
Ric, F. (2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(3), 184–211.
Ratcliff, R. (1993). Methods for dealing with reaction time outliers.
Psychological Bulletin, 114(3), 510–32.
Schacter, D.L., Wig, G.S., Stevens, W.D. (2007). Reductions in cortical ac-
tivity during priming. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 17(2), 171–6.
Solarz, A.K. (1960). Latency of instrumental responses as a function of
compatibility with the meaning of eliciting verbal signs. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 59(4), 239–45.
Toni, I., Rushworth, M.F., Passingham, R.E. (2001). Neural correlates of
visuomotor associations. Spatial rules compared with arbitrary rules.
Experimental Brain Research, 141, 359–69.
van Dantzig, S., Pecher, D., Zwaan, R.A. (2008). Approach and avoidance
as action effects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,
1298–306.
Weeks, R.A., Honda, M., Catalan, M.J., Hallett, M. (2001). Comparison of
auditory, somatosensory, and visually instructed and internally generated
finger movements: a PET study. NeuroImage, 14, 219–30.
Wentura, D., Rothermund, K., Bak, P. (2000). Automatic vigilance: The
attention-grabbing power of approach- and avoidance-related social in-
formation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(6), 1024–037.








ognitive and Brain Science user on 02 O
ctober 2018
Wig, G.S., Grafton, S.T., Demos, K.E., Kelley, W.M. (2005). Reductions in
neural activity underlie behavioral components of repetition priming.
Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1228–33.
Wise, S.P., Murray, E.A. (2000). Arbitrary associations between antecedents
and actions. Trends in Neuroscience, 23, 271–6.
Wise, S.P., di Pellegrino, G., Boussaoud, D. (1996). The premotor cortex
and nonstandard sensorimotor mapping. Canadian Journal of Physiology
and Pharmacology, 74, 469–82.








ognitive and Brain Science user on 02 O
ctober 2018
